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A B S T R A C T
The socio-communicative diﬃculties of individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are hypothesized to be
caused by a speciﬁc deﬁcit in the ability to represent one's own and others' mental states, referred to as Theory of
Mind or mentalizing. However, many individuals with ASD show successful performance on explicit measures of
mentalizing, and for this reason, the deﬁcit is thought to be better captured by measures of spontaneous men-
talizing. While there is initial behavioral support for this hypothesis, spontaneous mentalizing in ASD has not yet
been studied at the neural level. Recent ﬁndings indicate involvement of the right temporoparietal junction
(rTPJ) in both explicit and spontaneous mentalizing (Bardi et al., 2016). In the current study, we investigated
brain activation during explicit and spontaneous mentalizing in adults with ASD by means of fMRI. Based on our
hypothesis of a core mentalizing deﬁcit in ASD, decreased rTPJ activity was expected for both forms of men-
talizing. A group of 24 adults with ASD and 21 neurotypical controls carried out a spontaneous and an explicit
version of the same mentalizing task. They watched videos in which both they themselves and another agent
formed a belief about the location of an object (belief formation phase). Only in the explicit task version par-
ticipants were instructed to report the agent's belief on some trials. At the behavioral level, no group diﬀerences
were revealed in either of the task versions. A planned region-of-interest analysis of the rTPJ showed that this
region was more active for false- than for true-belief formation, independent of task version, especially when the
agent's belief had a positive content (when the agent was expecting the object). This eﬀect of belief was absent in
adults with ASD. A whole-brain analysis revealed reduced activation in the anterior middle temporal pole in ASD
for false - versus true-belief trials, independent of task version. Our ﬁndings suggest neural diﬀerences between
adults with ASD and neurotypical controls both during spontaneous and explicit mentalizing, and indicate the
rTPJ to be crucially involved in ASD. Moreover, the possible role of the anterior middle temporal pole in dis-
turbed mentalizing in ASD deserves further attention. The ﬁnding that these neural diﬀerences do not necessarily
lead to diﬀerential performance warrants further research.
1. Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder
estimated to be present in 0.62% of the total population (Elsabbagh
et al., 2012). It is characterized by impairments in social communica-
tion and interaction, as well as by restricted, repetitive patterns of be-
havior, interests and/or activities (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). An inﬂuential theory in explaining the socio-communicative
diﬃculties of individuals with ASD is the ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) theory
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), which proposes that there is a speciﬁc ToM
deﬁcit in ASD. ToM, or mentalizing, is deﬁned as the ability to re-
present one's own and someone else's mental states, such as desires,
beliefs and intentions (Premack and Woodruﬀ, 1978; Wimmer and
Perner, 1983). In the experimental setting, ToM ability is often assessed
by means of ‘false-belief tasks’. In such tasks, an agent holds a belief
about the location of an object, after which this location changes out-
side of the agent's awareness. Participants are then asked to indicate
where the agent expects the object to be. When they indicate the lo-
cation based on the false belief of the other agent, this is considered
successful ToM.
Based on these tasks, ToM ability was long thought to develop
around the age of four years in typically developing children (Wellman
et al., 2001), and in their original study, Baron-Cohen et al. showed that
most children with ASD, older than four years of age, failed on such a
false-belief task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Later studies challenged
these results, however, ﬁnding that children and adults with ASD often
pass false-belief tasks (Bowler, 1992; Frith and Happé, 1994; Ozonoﬀ
et al., 1991). More advanced tasks were developed in order to measure
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ToM in less simplistic ways, but even such higher-order ToM tasks are
passed by many individuals with ASD, especially high-functioning in-
dividuals (Ponnet et al., 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001; Scheeren et al.,
2013; Spek et al., 2010).
In order to explain the inconsistency between the social and com-
municative problems that people with ASD encounter in daily life on
the one hand, and the apparent absence of a ToM deﬁcit in classical
ToM tasks on the other hand, it has recently been proposed that in-
dividuals with ASD are speciﬁcally aﬀected in spontaneous mentalizing
(Frith, 2012; Senju, 2012, 2013). Spontaneous mentalizing refers to the
spontaneous sensitivity to others' mental states without the need to
deliberately reﬂect on them, and is deﬁned as fast, but inﬂexible
mentalizing. This stands in contrast to explicit mentalizing, which
happens more slowly and deliberately and is therefore also more cog-
nitively demanding (Apperly and Butterﬁll, 2009; Nijhof et al., 2016).
Recent studies in neurotypical children and adults have shown that
humans indeed represent other people's mental states spontaneously,
and do so long before the age of four years (Clements and Perner, 1994;
Kovács et al., 2010; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Senju et al., 2011;
Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007).
In line with the hypothesis of a deﬁcit in spontaneous mentalizing in
ASD, several behavioral studies have shown such a deﬁcit both in
children and adults with ASD (Callenmark et al., 2014; Schneider et al.,
2013; Schuwerk et al., 2016; Schuwerk et al., 2015; Senju, 2012, 2013;
Senju et al., 2009). However, little is known about the neural correlates
of such a deﬁcit, as to our knowledge no study has investigated spon-
taneous mentalizing in ASD using neuroimaging measures. Comparing
the neural activity when performing spontaneous mentalizing tasks
between individuals with ASD and controls is highly important, as it
will reveal which brain regions might be impaired in ASD. In addition,
direct comparisons with more explicit ToM measures are needed to
evaluate how individuals with ASD eventually circumvent mentalizing
problems to succeed on explicit tasks. One possibility is that under
explicit instructions, when they are able to do so, individuals with ASD
rely more heavily on domain-general brain regions involved in execu-
tive control and working memory, thus compensating for their domain-
speciﬁc ToM deﬁcit (Carruthers, 2015).
In fact, also in neurotypicals, most neuroimaging studies on ToM
have exclusively used explicit tasks. Explicit ToM tasks have con-
sistently been shown to activate a network of brain regions that is now
referred to as the mentalizing or ToM network (Decety and Lamm,
2007; Frith and Frith, 2003; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; McCleery et al.,
2011; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle,
2009). These regions include part of the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the precuneus (PC), tem-
poral poles and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS). In in-
dividuals with ASD, altered activity has been found in these regions
during explicit mentalizing, particularly in the right TPJ (Eddy, 2016;
Kana et al., 2009; Kennedy and Courchesne, 2008; Koster-Hale et al.,
2013; Lombardo et al., 2011; Murdaugh et al., 2014; Spengler et al.,
2010).
Only recently, some studies did make an eﬀort to test neural activity
in healthy adults during spontaneous mentalizing (Hyde et al., 2015;
Kovács et al., 2014; Naughtin et al., 2017; Schneider et al., 2014). All of
these studies found increased activity in regions that are usually asso-
ciated with explicit mentalizing, although the precise regions diﬀered.
For false versus true beliefs, Kovács et al. (2014) found activity in TPJ
and mPFC; Hyde et al. (2015), who focused speciﬁcally on the TPJ
using near-infrared-spectroscopy, also found TPJ activation, whereas in
the study by Schneider et al. (2014) the left STS and PC were sig-
niﬁcantly more active. Finally, Naughtin et al. (2017) found signiﬁcant
activation of TPJ during false beliefs vs. no-beliefs in a spontaneous
ToM task. Hyde et al. (2015) and Schneider et al. (2014) also used an
explicit task within the same study, but since in both studies the
spontaneous and explicit tasks relied on entirely diﬀerent contrasts, the
studies did not allow for direct comparisons. In order to investigate
similarities and diﬀerences between spontaneous and explicit menta-
lizing, using tasks that enable a direct comparison is important. Fur-
thermore, we want to reliably test to what extent spontaneous menta-
lizing is deﬁcient in ASD, and how this may be compensated for under
explicit instructions. This means both spontaneous and explicit men-
talizing processes should be tested within-subjects (in an ASD and a
control group), using the same outcome measures.
To this end, we recently developed the ‘Buzz Lightyear task’, which
is an adaptation of the paradigm by Kovács et al. (2014, 2010), and
validated it both in clinical an non-clinical samples (Bardi et al., 2016;
Deschrijver et al., 2015; Nijhof et al., 2016). Participants watch movies
in which they themselves and another agent (Buzz) form beliefs about
the location of a ball (belief formation phase): the ball is either behind a
screen or rolls out of the scene. Then the screen disappears and parti-
cipants have to press a key if the ball is present (outcome phase). Im-
portantly, whether the ball is present or absent is random and in-
dependent of the belief formation phase. In case the participant engages
in spontaneous mentalizing, not only the participant's own belief, but
also that of the agent is expected to have an eﬀect on reaction times
(RTs) to the ball. As a consequence, RTs are hypothesized to be longest
when neither the participant nor the agent is expecting the ball to be
present. Importantly, while mentalizing is always measured implicitly,
two diﬀerent versions of the task are created by means of adding catch
questions that either make the mentalizing process explicit (asking
about Buzz’ belief), or keep it spontaneous (asking about a physical
feature of Buzz).
Recently, both task versions of the Buzz Lightyear task were applied
in healthy participants in the MRI scanner (Bardi et al., 2016). During
the belief formation phase, more activity was found in the rTPJ on false-
belief trials (when the participant saw the ball change location after the
agent left) in comparison to true-belief trials. This enhanced activation
appeared to be speciﬁc for trials on which the agent had a belief with
positive content (i.e., he was expecting the ball). Kovács et al. (2014),
who applied a similar ball detection task, similarly found enhanced
rTPJ activation speciﬁcally when tracking another person's belief about
the presence, but not the absence of an object. However, in their study
only spontaneous mentalizing was tested and a comparison with an
explicit version could not be made. Importantly, Bardi et al. (2016)
found that this content speciﬁcity is not exclusive to spontaneous
mentalizing but is apparent in both the spontaneous and explicit ver-
sion of the task. This suggests the speciﬁc involvement of the rTPJ when
the agent's belief has a positive content, which has been described as a
potential representational limit of the mentalizing system (Bardi et al.,
2016). They also did not ﬁnd other signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
task versions, indicating that the neural mechanisms underlying spon-
taneous mentalizing overlap with those observed during explicit men-
talizing.
As mentioned previously, spontaneous mentalizing in ASD has not
yet been investigated by means of fMRI. It is strongly warranted to do
so, in a direct comparison with explicit mentalizing, in order to gain a
better insight into the neurocognitive bases of mentalizing deﬁcits in
ASD. The aim of the current study therefore was to compare brain ac-
tivation as measured by fMRI, with a particular focus on the rTPJ,
during the spontaneous and explicit version of the Buzz Lightyear task
between a group of adults with ASD and neurotypicals. We performed a
region-of-interest (ROI) analysis on the cluster of activity in rTPJ that
Bardi et al. (2016) found using the same task in an independent, neu-
rotypical sample. This allowed us to test whether we ﬁnd diﬀerent ef-
fects of belief and belief content on rTPJ activity between adults with
ASD and controls. In line with previous ﬁndings (Bardi et al., 2016;
Kovács et al., 2014), we expected to ﬁnd increased activity for false
beliefs in the rTPJ during belief formation in our control group, both
during spontaneous and explicit mentalizing, especially when the agent
believes the ball to be present (i.e., when his belief has a positive
content). Given the hypothesis of a mentalizing deﬁcit in ASD, reﬂected
in reduced activity in the core mentalizing region rTPJ, we
A.D. Nijhof et al. NeuroImage: Clinical 18 (2018) 475–484
476
hypothesized that this (content-speciﬁc) increase in rTPJ activity would
be smaller or absent in the ASD group in both task versions. However,
at the behavioral level the deﬁcit may only show for the spontaneous
version, as participants with ASD may use compensatory strategies in
the explicit version (Frith, 2012; Senju, 2012).
Based on this idea that adults with ASD may compensate for their
core mentalizing deﬁcit during explicit mentalizing, additional activity
could be expected here in regions associated with working memory and
executive control, which is not seen in neurotypicals. To test this, in
addition to our ROI analysis of the rTPJ, we analyzed the data at the
level of the whole brain to check for additional group diﬀerences in
activations during the belief formation phase.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Twenty-six adults with ASD (15 male) and twenty-ﬁve healthy
control participants (12 male) participated in the study. Participants
with ASD were recruited through an announcement that was dis-
tributed by the Flemish Autism Association, an organization serving the
interests of individuals with ASD and those in their direct environment,
and by Tanderuis, an organization that provides in-home supervision to
individuals with ASD. Control participants were recruited via social
media as well as paper announcements, and did not have any reported
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. A score above the cut-
oﬀ on the Autism Spectrum Quotient (i.e., a score of 32 or higher) was
used as exclusion criterion for the control group; all controls scored
below this cut-oﬀ.
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were
right-handed, as was conﬁrmed by the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (Oldﬁeld, 1971). All participants gave written informed
consent prior to the study, and were ﬁnancially compensated for their
participation. The study was approved by the local ethics committee of
the University Hospital of Ghent.
All ASD participants had received an oﬃcial clinical diagnosis by a
multidisciplinary team including a psychiatrist prior to the study. After
they entered the study, this diagnosis was veriﬁed by a trained psy-
chologist by means of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
(ADOS-2, Lord et al., 2000), Module 4. ADOS-2 scores were calculated
with a newly-developed revised algorithm (Hus and Lord, 2014), based
on scores on two subscales: Social Aﬀect and Restricted Repetitive
Behaviors. Seven participants in our ﬁnal ASD sample scored below the
ADOS cut-oﬀ. However, this is not uncommon in samples with high-
functioning adults (Deschrijver et al., 2015; Magnée et al., 2008;
Zwickel et al., 2011), and importantly, excluding these participants
from the whole-brain or ROI analyses did not signiﬁcantly alter the
main ﬁndings. Therefore, in the analyses we will report ﬁndings for the
complete ASD sample.
Due to data loss or poor data quality, one participant from the ASD
group and three participants from the neurotypical group had to be
excluded. In addition, one participant from each group showed below-
chance performance on the main task and these were therefore also
excluded. The ﬁnal sample therefore consisted of 24 participants (13
male) in the ASD group, and 21 participants (11 male) in the control
group. Age ranged between 19 and 51 years, and did not diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly between groups (t (43)= 0.633, p=0.53). Also gender ratio
was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between groups (χ(1)= 0.01, p=0.91).
An overview of all group characteristics is displayed in Table 1.
IQ scores were assessed with a seven-subtest short form of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IV; Meyers et al., 2013;
Wechsler, 2014), except when participants had already received a full
WAIS-IV test, which was the case for six participants in the ASD group.
Unfortunately, IQ was not measured for two participants in the control
group, as they dropped out after the ﬁrst session of the experiment. All
participants had IQ scores above 80 (range: 81–132). IQ scores were
slightly higher in the control group than in the ASD group (M=114.0,
SD=9.1 and M=106.4, SD=16.0 respectively), but this diﬀerence
was not signiﬁcant (t (41)= 1.97, p=0.06 (Table 1).
2.2. Task and stimuli
Stimuli were presented using Presentation software, version 16.5,
onto a screen that participants watched through a mirror mounted over
the MR head coil. Participants performed two versions of the ‘Buzz
Lightyear task’ (Bardi et al., 2016; Deschrijver et al., 2015; Nijhof et al.,
2016), which is an adaptation of the task originally developed by
Kovács et al. (2010). Participants watch short videos and are asked to
detect an object at the end of each video. Spontaneous and explicit
versions of this task were created by means of catch questions that were
sometimes presented after a video. Since we use a paradigm that is
highly similar to that used by Nijhof et al. (2016) and Bardi et al.
(2016), this section is an adaptation of an existing Methods section
(Nijhof et al., 2016, p. 4–5).
2.2.1. Main task
Participants watched short (13,850ms) video animations of 720 by
480 pixels. In each video, an agent (Buzz Lightyear) placed a ball on a
table. The ball rolled behind an occluder and subsequently there were
four possible continuations (see Fig. 1, Belief Formation phase):
1. Resulting in the agent holding a true belief (i.e., true in the eyes of
the participant) about the ball being present (P+A+ condition:
P=participant, A= agent, +=belief of presence, −=belief of
absence).
2. Resulting in the agent holding a true belief about the ball being
absent (P-A- condition).
3. Resulting in the agent holding a false belief about the ball being
present (P-A+ condition).
4. Resulting in the agent holding a false belief about the ball being
absent (P+A- condition).
In each video, the agent left the scene at some point. This varied in
timing between conditions: Buzz left 5000ms after movie onset for
condition P-A+, 7624ms after movie onset for condition P+A-, and
9874ms after movie onset for conditions P+A+ and P-A-. In order to
ensure that participants were paying attention to the on-going video,
they had to press a button with their left index ﬁnger when Buzz left the
scene. The agent always returned to the scene at 12,694ms.
In the Outcome Phase (see Fig. 1), the occluder fell (at 13,250ms).
Participants had to press a button with their right index ﬁnger as
quickly as possible when the ball was behind the occluder, which was
the case on half of the trials. The absence (B-) or presence (B+) of the
ball was completely random and independent of the belief formation
phase. It could thus be expected or unexpected for the participant and/
or the agent. Sometimes a catch question was presented after the end of
the movie (see next section). Between movie and catch question (if it
was presented), and always before the onset of the next movie, a
Table 1
Characteristics for the ASD and control group: means (M) and standard deviations (SD).
ASD group
(N=24)
M (SD)
Control group
(N=21)
M (SD)
Age 32.8 (8.4) 31.1 (8.6)
IQ (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
IV, short-form)
106.4 (16.0) 114.0 (9.1)
Autism Spectrum Quotienta 36.2 (5.4) 14.3 (6.7)
Social Responsiveness Scale for Adults,
T-scorea
78.0 (8.1) 51.2 (9.2)
a Diﬀerence between groups is signiﬁcant at an α–level of p < 0.05.
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variable inter-trial interval (ITI) was presented (black screen). This was
done by means of a pseudo-logarithmic jitter with steps of 600ms: half
of the ITIs were short (ranging from 200 to 2000ms), one-third were
intermediate (from 2600 to 4400ms), and one-sixth were long (from
5000 to 6800ms), resulting in a mean ITI of 2700ms.
Thus the design of the main task consisted of three factors with two
levels each: 2 (agent's belief: false/true from the perspective of the
participant)× 2 (agent's belief content: ball present/absent)× 2 (out-
come: ball present/absent). RT data were only available for conditions
with outcome ‘ball present’. Movies for each condition were repeated
10 times. These 80 movies per task version were presented in a ran-
domized order in two blocks of 40 trials, with a short break in between
blocks. Before the start of the actual experiment, both on the sponta-
neous and explicit versions of the task, participants completed four
practice trials. During these trials they received feedback, while during
the real experiment they did not. No catch questions were presented
after practice trials.
2.2.2. Catch questions
The spontaneous and explicit versions of the task only diﬀered with
respect to the catch questions. These questions appeared randomly after
20% of the movies: 8 per 40 trials of each block in both task versions.
Questions were presented in black text on a light grey background for
1000ms. In the spontaneous task version, the question was: ‘Did Buzz
have a blue cap?’ The cap could be either blue (50% of the movies) or
red (50%). In the explicit task version, the question was: ‘Did Buzz think
the ball was behind the screen?’ Participants were explicitly instructed
to keep track of Buzz’ initial belief about the location of the ball, that is,
prior to the revelation of its true location. The answer to this catch
question was also ‘Yes' in 50% of the movies. It can be assumed that if
participants performed above chance on these catch trials, they were
consciously keeping track of the agent's belief during the movies, and
that mentalizing on this version of the task was therefore explicit. The
words ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ were presented on the left or right of the screen in
both task versions. 50% of catch questions had ‘Yes' printed left and
‘No’ right, 50% vice versa. In this way, responses could not be planned
in advance. Participants had to respond to the answer on the left with
their left middle ﬁnger, to the answer on the right with their left index
ﬁnger (Nijhof et al., 2016, p. 5).
2.3. Questionnaires
Participants ﬁlled out the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001), a self-report measure assessing ASD symptoma-
tology. In addition, participants ﬁlled out the Social Responsiveness
Scale for Adults (SRS-A; Constantino and Gruber, 2002) to assess levels
of social responsiveness.
2.4. Procedure
The study consisted of two experimental sessions. The ﬁrst session
was carried out at the University Hospital. Participants ﬁrst ﬁlled out a
screening questionnaire to control for any exclusion criteria for MRI
research. They then carried out the two versions of the Buzz Lightyear
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the eight diﬀerent conditions, resulting from four diﬀerent options in the belief formation phase (middle two columns: P+A+, P-A-, P-A+, P+A-) and
two options in the outcome phase (right column: B-, B+), of which one (B+) is depicted here.
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task while lying in the MRI scanner, as well as another, unrelated task
for which results will be reported elsewhere. The spontaneous task
version was always carried out ﬁrst, and followed by a short debrieﬁng
questionnaire to make sure participants were not explicitly reasoning
about the other agent's belief (see Bardi et al., 2016). Both task versions
lasted about 25min, and the entire test session in the scanner lasted
approximately one hour. After this, participants ﬁlled out the remaining
questionnaires.
During the second session, which took place at the Faculty of
Psychology and Educational Sciences, participants with ASD were ﬁrst
assessed with the ADOS-2, after which they carried out the seven-
subtest short form of the WAIS-IV. For control participants, the second
session consisted of the WAIS-IV short form only.
2.5. fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing
Images of blood‑oxygen level dependent (BOLD) changes were ac-
quired with a 3 T Siemens Magnetom Trio scanner (Erlangen,
Germany), using a 32-channel head coil. Pillows were used to minimize
participants' head movement, and earphones to minimize scanner
noise. Before collecting functional images, we ﬁrst acquired 176 high-
resolution structural (anatomical) images with a T1-weighted 3D
MPRAGE sequence (repetition time (TR)=2530ms, echo time
(TE)= 2.58ms, image matrix= 256×256, ﬁeld of view
(FOV)= 220mm, ﬂip angle= 78°, slice thickness= 0.90mm, voxel
size= 0.9×0.86×0.86mm (resized to 1× 1×1mm)). During the
experiment, whole-brain functional images were obtained in four se-
parate series (one per block of each task version) with a T2*-weighted
EPI sequence (TR=2000ms, TE= 28ms, image matrix= 64×64,
FOV=224mm, ﬂip angle= 80°, slice thickness= 3.0mm, distance
factor= 17%, voxel size= 3.5×3.5×3.0, 34 axial slices). Volumes
were aligned along the AC-PC axis.
The acquired fMRI data were preprocessed using the MatLab-
toolbox SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London,
UK). The ﬁrst four volumes were removed for each EPI series, to allow
magnetization to reach a dynamic equilibrium. The remaining volumes
were ﬁrst spatially realigned using a rigid body transformation.
Secondly, the realigned images were slice time corrected using the ﬁrst
slice as a reference. The structural image was co-registered with the
mean of the slice time corrected images, and during segmentation, the
structural scans were brought in line with SPM8 tissue probability
maps. The parameters estimated during segmentation were then used to
normalize the functional images to standard MNI space. Lastly, the
normalized functional images were resampled into voxels of 3× 3mm
and spatially smoothed using an isotropic 8mm full width at half
maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
2.6. Behavioral data analysis
All behavioral data were analyzed with IBM SPSS Statistics 20 (SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). Three participants in the ASD group and one
participant in the control group used incorrect response buttons during
the tasks, and therefore their responses were not recorded properly.
Still, alternative button presses were partially recorded, and their re-
sponses to the catch questions indicated they did understand the task
instructions correctly. For this reason they were not excluded from the
fMRI analyses. Behavioral data analysis, however, could only be done
on 21 ASD participants, and 20 control participants.
We performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on ball detection RTs
with Version (spontaneous/explicit), Belief (false belief/true belief) and
Agent's Belief Content (ball present/ball absent according to the agent)
as within-subjects factors, and Group as between-subjects factor.
Planned comparisons were carried out for the ‘ToM index’, the diﬀer-
ence between the P-A- and P-A+ condition, for reasons of comparison
with previous studies that used this diﬀerence as the behavioral index
of spontaneous mentalizing (Bardi et al., 2016; Deschrijver et al., 2015;
Nijhof et al., 2016). Estimates of eﬀect size are reported: for ANOVAs
this is the partial eta-squared (0.01= small, 0.06=medium,
0.14= large eﬀect); Cohen's d (0.2= small, 0.5=medium,
0.8= large eﬀect) is reported for t-tests (Cohen, 1988).
To evaluate accuracy, we compared between groups and task ver-
sions the number of correct responses, that is: responses that were not
misses (no response or a response slower than 1000ms on trials where
there was a ball in the outcome phase) or false alarms (responses on
trials where there was no ball in the outcome phase). In addition, we
checked for between-group diﬀerences in the number of correctly an-
swered catch questions in both task versions.
2.7. fMRI data analysis
First- and second-level analyses were carried out using SPM8
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK).
2.7.1. First-level analysis
At the single-subject level, analyses were performed using the gen-
eral linear model (Friston et al., 1995). This model contained, for each
block, four regressors for the belief formation phase (all combinations
of Belief and Agent's Belief Content), with durations of 9 s: from the
moment the agent places the ball on the table until the moment he re-
enters the scene. Additionally, eight regressors were added for the
outcome phase (all combinations of Belief, Agent's Belief Content and
Outcome), with durations of 0 s: at the moment the occluder has
completely fallen down and ball presence/absence is revealed. Thus,
there were twelve regressors of interest both for the spontaneous and
for the explicit version of the task. In addition, six movement regressors,
calculated during the realignment step of preprocessing, were added for
each block to account for head motion. All regressors were convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function (Friston et al.,
1996).
2.7.2. ROI analysis
Signal-change analysis was carried out for an a-priori deﬁned region
of interest (ROI). This region was deﬁned on the basis of the whole-
brain ﬁndings of Bardi et al. (2016), who used the same task as the one
used in the current study, in an independent, neurotypical sample. In
this study, a region in the right angular gyrus/right TPJ, with peak
MNI-coordinates (42, −67, 43), was found to show higher activity
during false- than during true-belief formation.
We created a sphere with a radius of 5mm around the coordinates
(42,−67, 43). Beta values for the activity in this ROI during the belief
formation phase (the 9 s regressors) were extracted using the MarsBar
toolbox for SPM (Brett et al., 2002). These beta values were analyzed in
a repeated-measures ANOVA with within-subjects factors Version, Be-
lief and Agent's Belief Content, and a between-subjects factor Group.
Estimates of eﬀect size are again reported. We were particularly in-
terested in the between-group diﬀerence on the False Belief, Positive
Content (P-A+) condition as compared to the other conditions, as this
condition has consistently been found to show more activity in the rTPJ
than any of the other three conditions (Bardi et al., 2016; Kovács et al.,
2014). Therefore, a follow-up repeated-measures ANOVA was planned
in which the ROI activity of this particular condition was compared to
the average of the three other conditions.
2.7.3. Whole-brain analysis
In addition to the ROI analysis, we also carried out analyses at the
level of the whole brain. Contrast images acquired in the ﬁrst-level
analysis were entered into the second-level analysis, using two-sample
t-tests on the contrasts of interest in order to test for group diﬀerences.
To test for activations across the two groups, ﬁrst-level contrast images
of both groups together were entered, with subject as a random vari-
able, using one-sample t-tests on the same contrasts of interest. Results
of the whole-brain analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons
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using a cluster-extent based thresholding approach (Poline et al., 1997):
a voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.001 was combined with a cluster ex-
tent threshold determined by SPM8 (p < 0.05 family-wise-error (FWE)
cluster-corrected threshold). All clusters reported exceeded this cluster-
corrected threshold. Reported cluster coordinates correspond to the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinate system, and were
labeled using the AAL labeling atlas in SPM8.
We were interested in diﬀerences between false-belief (FB) and true-
belief (TB) conditions during the belief formation phase (the 9 s re-
gressors), between and across task versions. To test for the eﬀect across
task versions, we applied the contrast [FB (P+A-+P-A+) > TB (P
+A++P-A-)]. To test for the interaction of this eﬀect with task ver-
sion, we applied the contrast [(FB > TB explicit) > (FB > TB spon-
taneous)], as well as the reverse contrast [(FB > TB
spontaneous) > (FB > TB explicit)]. Finally, to test whether there
was a speciﬁc eﬀect for the agent's false belief with a positive content as
compared to a negative content (Bardi et al., 2016; Kovács et al., 2014),
a contrast [P-A+ > P+A-] was run. All these contrasts were calcu-
lated across groups, and between groups in order to investigate possible
group diﬀerences.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral data
3.1.1. Reaction times
Average RTs are displayed per task version, per group in Fig. 2. The
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Belief
(F(1, 41)= 13.88, p=0.001, η2= 0.25), with longer RTs for true
beliefs than for false beliefs. Furthermore, there was a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of Agent's Belief Content (F(1, 41)= 5.33, p=0.03, η2= 0.12):
RTs were longer when the agent's belief was negative (when he did not
expect the ball). Importantly, the interaction eﬀect between Belief and
Agent's Belief Content was signiﬁcant as well (F(1, 41)= 30.89,
p < 0.001, η2= 0.43), with RTs being longest for the P-A- condition
(in which neither participant nor agent expected the ball). Planned
comparisons between the P-A- and P-A+ condition revealed that the
crucial ToM index was indeed signiﬁcant (p= 0.001).
The main eﬀect of Group was marginally signiﬁcant (t (41)= 1.88,
p=0.07, d=0.59), with RTs in general being somewhat slower in the
ASD group (M=447.0, SD=130.7) than in the control group
(M=386.0, SD=66.8). However, none of the other factors showed a
signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect with Group (all p-values> 0.1). Also when
speciﬁcally testing for diﬀerences on the ToM index, this was not found
to diﬀer signiﬁcantly between groups, neither on the spontaneous task
version (p=0.65; ASD: M=22.0, SD=71.2; controls: M=29.7,
SD=33.0), nor on the explicit task version (p=0.17; ASD: M=41.6,
SD=74.5; controls: M=14.4, SD=52.8).
The main eﬀect of Version was also marginally signiﬁcant (F(1,
41)= 3.54, p=0.07, η2= 0.08). RTs on the spontaneous mentalizing
version of the task were slightly faster (M=410.2, SD=14.3) than on
the explicit version of the task (M=422.7, SD=18.5), but none of the
other factors interacted signiﬁcantly with task version (all p-values>
0.1).
3.1.2. Accuracy
On average, participants responded correctly on 95.4% of the trials
of the spontaneous version, and on 96.5% of the trials of the explicit
Fig. 2. Average reaction times to the ball per condition, in milliseconds. Error bars represent± 1 standard error. Left: control group (C); right: ASD group. A. Spontaneous task version; B.
Explicit task version.
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version. The number of correct trials was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between task versions (t (41)= 1.48, p=0.15, d=0.46). Also, groups
did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to the number of correct trials
on either the spontaneous task version (t (40)= 0.50, p=0.62,
d= 0.16) or the explicit task version (t (41)= 0.70, p=0.49,
d= 0.22).
3.1.3. Catch questions and debrieﬁng
Across the two groups, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
spontaneous and explicit task versions in the number of correct catch
questions (t (40)= 1.61, p=0.12, d=0.51). In addition, no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence between the ASD and control group was found in the
number of correct catch questions on either the spontaneous task ver-
sion (t (40)= 1.13, p=0.25, d= 0.36; ASD: M=11.9, SD=3.0,
controls: M=12.7, SD=1.4) or the explicit task version (t
(40)= 1.17, p=0.25, d=0.37; ASD: M=11.3, SD=2.4, controls:
M=12.1, SD=1.5). On the debrieﬁng questionnaire that participants
ﬁlled out after completing the spontaneous task version, none of the
participants revealed any awareness of what this task intended to
measure, or of the possible inﬂuence of Buzz’ beliefs on their RTs.
3.2. ROI analysis
A graph of the extracted beta values per task version, per group can
be found in Fig. 3. The repeated-measures ANOVA with factors Version,
Belief, Agent's Belief Content and Group revealed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of Version (F(1, 43)= 21.24, p < 0.001, η2= 0.33), indicating
higher activity in this ROI in the explicit than in the spontaneous task
version. Furthermore, as expected, there was a main eﬀect of Belief (F
(1, 43)= 18.77, p < 0.001, η2= 0.30), with activity in the ROI being
higher for false beliefs than for true beliefs. There was also a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of Agent's Belief Content (F(1, 43)= 5.04, p=0.03, η2= 0.11):
activity was higher when the agent's belief had a positive content (i.e.,
when he was expecting the ball to be present).
In addition, the interaction between Belief and Agent's Belief
Content was signiﬁcant (F(1, 43)= 10.88, p=0.002, η2= 0.20). Post
hoc comparisons revealed that this interaction could be explained by
higher activation for the false belief, positive content condition (P-A+)
than for any of the other three conditions (all p≤ 0.001) (in line with
Bardi et al., 2016; Kovács et al., 2014).
Although there was a main eﬀect of Version, there were no sig-
niﬁcant interactions with Version (all p > 0.21).
Finally, there was a trend toward a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect
between Belief, Agent's Belief Content and Group (F(1, 43)= 3.65,
p=0.06, η2= 0.08). Based on the previous observation that the false
belief eﬀect in the current task is primarily driven by the false belief
condition with positive content (Bardi et al., 2016; Kovács et al., 2014),
we compared the P-A+ condition with the average of the three other
conditions. This revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Condition (F(1,
43)= 31.93, p < 0.001, η2= 0.43), again conﬁrming that activity in
the ROI was higher for the P-A+ condition than for the other three
conditions. Furthermore, there was a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect of
Condition and Group (F(1, 43)= 6.22, p=0.02, η2= 0.13), indicating
the diﬀerence between P-A+ and the other three conditions was sig-
niﬁcantly larger for the control group than for the ASD group. This
diﬀerence between P-A+ and the other conditions was not found to
correlate with ASD symptom severity as measured by the ADOS in the
ASD group, or the AQ/SRS-A in either group (all p > 0.51).
3.3. Whole-brain analysis
Results of the whole-brain analysis for all contrasts are summarized
in Table 2, and the most relevant clusters are displayed in Fig. 4.
During the belief formation phase, across all contrasts, there was
one single region showing diﬀerential activation between groups: a
region at the right anterior middle temporal pole (peak coordinates: 57,
−1, −20) was signiﬁcantly more active for the [FB > TB] contrast in
the control group than it was in the ASD group. There were no sig-
niﬁcant group diﬀerences for any of the other contrasts.
Across groups, for the [FB > TB] contrast, we found three regions
to be consistently more activated: a region on the right angular gyrus/
right TPJ (peak coordinates: 57, −52, 34), right lingual gyrus (12,
−70, 1), and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (45, 32, 37).
In computing the interaction of the eﬀect of belief with task version
[(FB > TB explicit) > (FB > TB spontaneous)], only one region was
found to be signiﬁcantly more active, which was a region in the left
middle frontal gyrus (peak coordinates: −21, 50, 31). For the reverse
contrast [(FB > TB spontaneous) > (FB > TB explicit)], no sig-
niﬁcant clusters were found.
The contrast testing for the speciﬁc eﬀect of the agent's false belief
with positive content yielded signiﬁcant clusters in the right TPJ (peak
coordinates: 48, −46, 31) and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(peak coordinates: 48, 32, 31).
4. Discussion
With this study we investigated the brain regions underlying both
spontaneous and explicit mentalizing in adults with and without ASD.
Both forms of mentalizing could be compared directly because they
were measured on two versions of the same task, using the same de-
pendent variable. The aim was to investigate the hypothesis of a
spontaneous mentalizing deﬁcit in ASD, as well as which brain regions
are implicated. We focused speciﬁcally on the rTPJ, as this region has
been found crucial for both spontaneous and explicit mentalizing, and
has frequently been shown to be aﬀected in ASD in previous research.
Fig. 3. Extracted beta values for the ROI with coordinates (42, −67, 43), displayed per
task version, per condition. Blue=Control group (C)·Red=ASD group. Error bars in-
dicate± 1 standard error.
Table 2
Summary of contrasts in the whole-brain analysis that resulted in signiﬁcant activations.
Areas per contrast MNI peak coordinates (x,
y, z)
Cluster size Z-score
(FB > TB controls) > (FB > TB ASD)
R anterior middle temporal
pole
57, −1, −20 117 4.12
FB > TB
R TPJ 57, −52, 34 199 5.32
R lingual gyrus 12, −70, 1 115 5.11
R dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex
45, 32, 37 88 4.23
(FB > TB explicit) > (FB > TB spontaneous)
L middle frontal gyrus −21, 50, 31 74 3.93
P-A+ > P+A-
R TPJ 48, −46, 31 92 4.88
R dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex
48, 32, 31 208 4.47
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The ROI analysis of the rTPJ revealed signiﬁcant main and inter-
action eﬀects of belief and belief content on ROI activity, indicating
that the rTPJ was activated more during false- than during true-belief
formation, especially if these false beliefs had a positive content (i.e.,
when the agent believed the ball to be present behind the screen). These
eﬀects did not interact with task version. This study thus adds to the
increasing body of literature suggesting that the rTPJ is involved in
both spontaneous and explicit mentalizing (Bardi et al., 2016; Hyde
et al., 2015; Kovács et al., 2014; Naughtin et al., 2017). One might
argue that the overlap in activation patterns across task versions is due
to the fact that individuals used explicit mentalizing during the spon-
taneous task version, but this seems rather unlikely. During debrieﬁng
participants revealed no awareness of what this task intended to mea-
sure, or of the possible inﬂuence of Buzz’ beliefs on their RTs. Although
it cannot fully be excluded that they still may have had some awareness
of Buzz’ beliefs, this debrieﬁng suggests that participants were not
calculating these beliefs explicitly, and that the overlap in activation
patterns probably reﬂects a genuine overlap between spontaneous and
explicit mentalizing.
Diﬀerential processing of others' beliefs based on the content of
these beliefs (more rTPJ activation for beliefs with a positive content)
has been reported in previous studies on spontaneous mentalizing in
neurotypicals as well (Bardi et al., 2016; Kovács et al., 2014; Low and
Watts, 2013), suggesting that the rTPJ is involved only when one is
tracking another agent's belief about the presence of an object, not its
absence, as was also argued by Kovács et al. (2014). It should be con-
sidered, however, that on our task participants had to respond only to
ball presence, whereas in classical false belief tasks both absence and
presence of the object are relevant.
Interestingly, in keeping with our hypotheses, the content-speciﬁc
activation of the rTPJ for the other agent's belief was found to be at-
tenuated in individuals with ASD, in line with a deﬁcit in this core
mentalizing region in ASD (Eddy, 2016). As hypothesized, this diﬀer-
ence between groups was found independent of task version, suggesting
that impairment in functioning of the rTPJ is core to ASD.
At the behavioral level, groups did not diﬀer in the number of
correctly answered catch questions on either task version. This in-
dicates that they were equally successful in reporting the color of Buzz’
cap, but importantly also Buzz’ belief in the explicit version, suggesting
both ASD and control participants were able to mentalize explicitly.
Also, we did not ﬁnd any group diﬀerences in the eﬀects of the diﬀerent
conditions (belief, belief content) on RTs to the ball. For the explicit
version, this was not unexpected, as participants with ASD may have
compensated for the deﬁcit in rTPJ function. However, contrary to our
expectations there were also no behavioral group diﬀerences in the
spontaneous task version. This means that the observed diﬀerences
between groups at the rTPJ were not reﬂected in signiﬁcant diﬀerences
at the behavioral level. This latter ﬁnding is in contrast with several
other studies that did ﬁnd behavioral diﬀerences in spontaneous
mentalizing between individuals with ASD and controls (Callenmark
et al., 2014; Schneider et al., 2013; Schuwerk et al., 2015, 2016; Senju,
2012, 2013; Senju et al., 2009). A previous study from our group,
however, also did not ﬁnd a group diﬀerence in a similar spontaneous
ToM task (Deschrijver et al., 2015). This suggests that behavioral
ﬁndings on spontaneous mentalizing in ASD are not entirely consistent.
Note though that in our study, as in the study by Deschrijver et al.
(2015), the ToM index was numerically smaller for the ASD group in
the spontaneous task version, in line with expectations. Interestingly
though, it was larger in the explicit version. Diﬀerences were not sig-
niﬁcant however, possibly because there was insuﬃcient power to de-
tect a diﬀerence in combination with large variability on this measure.
Across groups, we replicated the ﬁndings of previous studies with this
task (Bardi et al., 2016; Nijhof et al., 2016): there were signiﬁcant main
and interaction eﬀects of belief and belief content on RTs, with no
diﬀerence in RT pattern between the spontaneous and explicit task
versions. RTs in the P-A- condition were signiﬁcantly longer than in all
other three conditions, crucially also the condition in which only the
agent expected the ball, the diﬀerence referred to as the ToM index.
With regard to the successful performance under explicit conditions,
it has been claimed that persons with ASD may compensate for deﬁcits
in mentalizing by recruiting more domain-general resources
(Carruthers, 2015; Frith, 2012). However, we did not ﬁnd evidence of
compensatory activity during explicit mentalizing in the ASD group at
the whole-brain level. In fact, also when contrasting false versus true
beliefs speciﬁcally for the explicit task version, we found no interaction
with group, and thus no evidence for compensation under explicit in-
structions in the ASD group. We found only one region to be diﬀeren-
tially activated between the ASD and control group, but with less ac-
tivation in ASD than controls: across task versions, a region in the right
anterior middle temporal pole showed higher activation for controls
than for adults with ASD for the contrast of false versus true beliefs. A
role for the anterior temporal pole in social cognition has been sug-
gested on a wide range of tasks, in which participants needed to un-
derstand intentions, read embarrassing or norm-violating stories, or
make moral and social judgments (Berthoz et al., 2002; Moll et al.,
2005; Walter et al., 2004; Zahn et al., 2007). A recent meta-analysis has
also suggested the temporal pole as being part of the mentalizing net-
work (Mar, 2011).In ASD, one study found altered activity in the
anterior temporal pole during emotion recognition (Hall et al., 2003),
and the current ﬁnding seems to suggest that activity in the anterior
temporal pole is also altered in ASD during mentalizing. The speciﬁc
role of this region in social cognition deserves further attention, as this
could give more insight in diﬀerential social processing in ASD.
Whole-brain analysis showed a cluster in the rTPJ, overlapping with
a posterior cluster of the TPJ shown to have strong connectivity to other
regions of the mentalizing network (Mars et al., 2012), to be more
active for false than for true beliefs during the belief formation phase. In
addition to rTPJ, regions in the right lingual gyrus and right
Fig. 4. Left, in red: The cluster of activation at the right anterior middle temporal pole (peak coordinates: 57, −1, −20) for the diﬀerence between groups on the contrast [false
belief > true belief]. Right, in green: The cluster of activation in the right TPJ (peak coordinates: 57, −52, 34) for the [false belief > true belief] contrast across groups.
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dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were also more active for false
belief processing. Previous studies have shown that the lingual gyrus is
involved in the processing of social information and mentalizing
(Raposo et al., 2011; Van der Cruyssen et al., 2014; Vanderwal et al.,
2008); the DLPFC is usually associated with working memory and
cognitive control (Banich, 2009; Levy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000;
MacDonald et al., 2000). Whereas Bardi et al. (2016) reported no dif-
ferential brain activity between the spontaneous and explicit versions of
the task, we found one region in left middle frontal gyrus to be more
active during the explicit task version than during the spontaneous task
version for the false versus true belief contrast. We hypothesize that this
is a domain-general region, that is not involved in mentalizing per se
but may be additionally recruited under explicit mentalizing instruc-
tions in order to more easily resolve the conﬂict between the own and
other agent's belief.
A limitation of our task design, which was also discussed in Bardi
et al. (2016), is the fact that for psychological reasons we could not
counterbalance the order of presentation of the two task versions. That
is, if a participant ﬁrst performed the explicit condition, the sponta-
neous condition that would follow logically would not be spontaneous
anymore. Still, we are conﬁdent that the ﬁxed order of the task versions
cannot explain our main ﬁndings. Task version was not found to in-
teract with any of the relevant factors (group, belief, belief content) for
the ROI analysis. At the whole-brain level we only found a single brain
region (left MFG) to be more active on the second task version for false
versus true beliefs, and no regions being less active. Importantly, in an
additional analysis (see also Bardi et al., 2016) we found that including
a linearly downward time modulation as a covariate in the SPM model
did not alter ﬁndings for either the ROI or the whole-brain analysis. In
conclusion, the ﬁxed order of presentation does not seem to explain the
main ﬁndings of the current study.
Given the fact that seven participants in our ASD group did not score
above the ADOS cut-oﬀ, one could question the homogeneity of our
ASD sample. First of all, however, it should be noted that all ASD
participants received an oﬃcial diagnosis from a multidisciplinary team
including a psychiatrist prior to the experiment. Second, as mentioned,
it is not uncommon that high-functioning adults with ASD score below
the cut-oﬀ (Deschrijver et al., 2015; Magnée et al., 2008; Zwickel et al.,
2011), and third, when we repeated our analyses in the sample of the
17 participants who did score above the cut-oﬀ, our results were vir-
tually identical to the results for the full ASD sample, both for the ROI
analysis and at the whole-brain level. This is in line with the fact that
we found no signiﬁcant correlations with measures of symptom se-
verity. Worth mentioning as well is that the percentage of women in the
current ASD sample was relatively high (11 of 24 participants), com-
pared to the majority of studies in ASD. However, ﬁrst, gender ratio was
matched between groups, and second, additional analyses including
gender did not reveal any eﬀects of gender. This indicates that the re-
latively high percentage of women in the ASD group did not inﬂuence
our main ﬁndings.
In conclusion, with this study we found that the rTPJ was less ac-
tivated in adults with ASD than in controls during mentalizing when the
agent formed a false belief about the ball being present. In line with our
expectations, this diﬀerence in rTPJ activity was found independent of
task version, suggesting a core impairment in this mentalizing area in
ASD. However, the neural diﬀerences did not result in reliable group
diﬀerences in RT patterns in either version, which warrants further
investigation.
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